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My thesis attends to a common thread of critique in two founding documents of “second-wave” 
feminism: Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique (1963) and Juliet Mitchell’s article 
“Women: The Longest Revolution” (1966).  I am interested in the ways both foundational texts de-
naturalize male supremacy by defining it as ideological.  The concept of ideology as employed by 
three notable social theorists – Marx’s concept of a social mythology disseminated by ruling elites to 
uphold various forms of hierarchy, operating through internal contradictions; French communist 
Louis Althusser’s concept of a social practice disseminated by the institutions of civil society; and 
Michel Foucault’s identification of ideology with discourses or regimes of representation that shape 
and delimit what can and cannot be said about a given topic – is central to both Friedan’s book and 
Mitchell’s article; although Mitchell, in keeping with her British socialist milieu, employs the term 
ideology much more extensively than Friedan, both authors provide a broad critical analysis of how 
ruling elites define and police “natural” and “deviant” forms of “femininity” and “the family” that 
can be summed up as a critical analysis of ideology.  My thesis seeks to challenge and broaden the 
common critique of “second-wave” feminism as narrowly middle-class and elitist to demonstrate the 
 v 
importance of Friedan’s and Mitchell’s insights for subsequent forms of radical social thought.  In 
the first section, I will examine both the draft versions and the published version of The Feminine 
Mystique to show how Friedan explores the intellectual, emotional, and psychological work done by 
conservative gender ideology, how she establishes its relationship to ideas of progress and 
temporality, and how she attends to the ways in which its gaps, contradictions, and omissions 
strengthen rather than weaken its hold on society.  In the second section I will perform the same 
analysis for Mitchell.  I will conclude by analyzing how the work of Friedan and Mitchell helped 
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Feminism as an ideological conviction and as a social movement has taken shape in 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing structures of power and privilege.  Its significance – and the 
significance of any other social movement trying to alter or abolish these structures – lies in the fact 
that, as trans activist Michelle O’Brien notes in “Tracing This Body: Transsexuality, 
Pharmaceuticals, and Capitalism,” “[w]e are all in the midst of structures of tremendous violence, 
oppression, and exploitation.  There is no easy escape or pure distance from them.  Our ability to 
resist … is deeply inseparable from our ongoing connection to these very systems.”1  To understand 
how individuals at different historical moments have been able to craft more or less radical challenges 
to these systems, to understand what they could and could not perceive about the changeability or 
justice of dominant views of gender relations, we must examine what they thought about power and 
ideology. 
 For a variety of reasons, 19th-century supporters of changes in the legal, economic, and 
educational position of women tended to build their arguments on biologist constructions of gender.  
They were products of a society in which belief in the possibility and desirability of social change was 
powerfully constrained by a naturalist-Darwinist imagination that, even as it acknowledged the 
reality of biological and social evolution, assumed there were limits beyond which it could not go.2  
                                                
1 Michelle O’Brien, “Tracing This Body: Transsexuality, Pharmaceuticals, and Capitalism,” in The Transgender Studies 
Reader 2, ed. Susan Stryker and Aren Z. Aizura (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, an imprint of 
Informa PLC], 2013), 56-65. 
2 See, for example, Monique Wittig, “One Is Not Born A Woman,” in Feminist Theory Reader: Local and Global 
Perspectives, 3rd ed., ed. Carole R. McCann and Seung-Kyung Kim (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, 
LLC, an imprint of Informa PLC], 2013): “feminism in the [19th] century could never resolve its contradictions on the 
subject of nature/culture, woman/society.  Women started to fight for themselves as a group and rightly considered that 
they shared common features as a result of oppression.  But for them these features were natural and biological rather 
than social.  They went so far as to adopt the Darwinist theory of evolution.  They did not believe like Darwin, however, 
 2 
The political and social environment of the 1960s in which “second-wave” feminism took shape was 
very different.  By the 1960s, it was easier than it had ever been before to understand that power 
relations, not immutable natural laws, shaped what could and could not be said about the nature, 
proper functions, and appropriate activities of women (and other social groups), and how prevalent 
constructions of these were governed by specifically ideological considerations.   
 I have chosen to focus on Betty Friedan’s 1963 book The Feminine Mystique and Juliet 
Mitchell’s 1966 essay “Women: the Longest Revolution” as key documents in the evolution of the 
second-wave feminist project of what Sally Haslanger, in her 2013 book Resisting Reality: Social 
Construction and Social Critique, calls “ideology critique.”  Ideology critique, in her words, “focuses 
on the conceptual and narrative frameworks that we employ in understanding and navigating the 
world, especially the social world … it need not introduce a wholly new concept, but can just suggest 
a revision to a concept or a new understanding of a concept.”3  For Haslanger, ideology critique is 
allied to both critical theory and social constructionism: critical theory, in her words, “is situated 
theory … with a commitment to a political movement and its questions,”4 while “one of the main 
goals of social constructionism is to lay bare the mechanisms by which social structures are formed 
and sustained so that we are better positioned to locate the levers for social change.”5 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘that women were less evolved than men, but they did believe that male and female natures had diverged in the course of 
evolutionary development and that society at large reflected this polarization … the early feminists had failed to regard 
history as a dynamic process which develops from conflicts of interests.  Furthermore, they still believed as men do that 
the cause (origin) of their oppression lay within themselves … [they] found themselves at an impasse … they upheld the 
illogical principle of ‘equality in difference’ … [t]hey fell back into the trap … [of] the myth of woman.”  Wittig, “One 
Is Not Born a Woman,” 248-49.  What this passage reveals is that the development of a principled rejection of all aspects 
of a hegemonic social order is impossible, not simply because of the social order itself (as though it were outside or 
separate from attempts to subvert it) but by the contradictions and inconsistencies within ideology critique and critical 
theory.  This thesis is an attempt to show not how Friedan and Mitchell resolved these contradictions and inconsistencies, 
assuming that to be possible, but how they recognized and negotiated them. 
3 Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
17-18, Oxford Scholarship Online. 
4 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 22. 
5 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 30. 
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Friedan and Mitchell – the latter to a greater extent than the former – anticipated in their works 
what would later be a central insight of Foucauldian philosophy: the fact that modernity instantiated 
new forms of social power rather than simply removing old restrictions.  Michel Foucault in his 
landmark 1975 book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison observed that the Janus faces of 
liberal modernity – of “a formally egalitarian juridical framework, made possible by the organization 
of a parliamentary, representative régime” – were “systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian and asymmetrical that we call the disciplines … The … disciplines constituted the 
foundation of the formal, juridical liberties.”6  In other words, developments that seem to free the 
individual from old restrictions impose new and more insidious ones.  This problematizes 
emancipatory narratives of “progress” from a “benighted” or “barbaric” past.  It forces us to rethink 
the nature of social change and to pay heed to the compromised origins and tactics of fights for 
social justice.   
For both Friedan and Mitchell, modernity is not a one-way street to women’s freedom.  Both The 
Feminine Mystique and “Women: the Longest Revolution” contain a powerful strain of argument 
and implication that anticipates the insight of Foucault described above.  Friedan and Mitchell 
explore the profoundly ambiguous relationship of “modernity” and “progress” to gendered 
hierarchies of power and knowledge.  They recognize that whatever changes have occurred in 
women’s condition in the 19th- and 20th-century West can be, and have been, used against them.  
Furthermore, both Friedan and Mitchell, with their Left backgrounds, are skeptical of attempts to 
claim increased power for women based on the very motherhood and domesticity used to 
subordinate them, claims which had been prominent in the rhetoric and ideology of earlier women’s 
                                                
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books 
[Random House, Inc., an imprint of RCA], 1978), 222; see also 195-228. 
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movements.7  They see that new ways must be found to navigate the tensions within ideological 
constructions of “woman” that both deny and enable rights claims.  For Friedan and Mitchell, 
ideology critique, critical theory, and social constructionism fuse in fascinating explorations of the 
nature of knowledge-as-power and its implications for feminist arguments and political strategies. 
  
                                                
7 See, for example, William O’Neill, “The Origins of American Feminism,” in The Other Half: Roads to Women’s 
Equality, ed. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein and William J. Goode (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Spectrum Books, an imprint of 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971): “while feminism was born out of a revolt against stifling domesticity, and nurtured in the 
understanding that for women to be free the entire fabric of their lives had to be rewoven, by the end of the century most 
feminists had succumbed to what Charlotte Perkins Gilman called the ‘domestic mythology’ … the effort to escape 
domesticity was accompanied by an invocation of the domestic ideal – woman’s freedom road circled back to the home 
from which feminism was supposed to liberate her.”  O’Neill, “The Origins of American Feminism,” 162-63.  We see 
here the enduring paradox of resistant social movements: they derive their existence and organizing principles from the 
conditions against which they rebel, or are seen to rebel.  For more on how Friedan’s Left background influenced her 
resistance to the identification of “women” with the “domestic,” see Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, introduction 
to The Feminine Mystique: 50th Anniversary Edition, by Betty Friedan, ed. Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, Norton 
Critical Editions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), xiii-xv; Anonymous [Betty Friedan], “UE Fights for 
Women Workers,” UE Publication No. 232 (New York: United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America 
[UE], 1952), and my discussion of Friedan below.  One of the sections in “UE Fights for Women Workers” is titled 
“Women Must Have Right to All Jobs”; see Anonymous [Friedan], “UE Fights for Women Workers,” 35. 
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Chapter 1 
The historical importance of works of radical social critique lies not in their unequivocal 
rejection of the status quo or freedom from logics of domination, since radicalism –recognition that 
the wrongs of a practice or system are foundational to a society’s existence – is itself a product of 
these logics.  Attempts to secure greater social justice spring from, and are anchored in, deep 
injustice.  It is in contradictions, uncertainties, hesitations, and other examples of split consciousness 
– in aporias or gaps - that radical flashes of insight can be discerned, which exemplify the creative 
tension between acceptance and questioning of dominant social structures.   
The act of noticing and criticizing violations of what has gradually become an international 
moral ideal – the principle that human flourishing (defined by Martha Nussbaum and others as the 
maximum of political, economic, educational, and artistic freedom and opportunity) is an end in 
itself and an essential precondition for a just society8 – is an act has taken many forms in many 
different historical periods.  As Haslanger notes, “the questions we ask arise out of a particular social-
historical context … it is not necessary to develop a single coherent position in order to promote 
social justice.”9  We cannot evaluate historical works of critique on the basis of ideological or 
thematic consistency, since, like all texts, they function through multiple unstable and opposed 
meanings.  But we can evaluate the degree to which they manifest a political understanding of 
ideology-as-power.  
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique, which called Cold War US society to task for its 
denial of opportunities to women, is both a product of a specific society at a specific historical 
                                                
8 See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), https://books.google.com/books?id=9R69I--
rpzUC&printsec=frontcover&dq=martha+nussbaum+capabilities&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj-
kIyr6KrXAhUcM8AKHZWOAw0Q6AEILjAB#v=onepage&q=martha%20nussbaum%20capabilities&f=false. 
9 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 23-25. 
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moment and an exemplar of the broader world-historical significance of 1960s and post-1960s 
radical social thought.  This chapter is a corrective to accounts of Friedan’s work and legacy that 
neglect the radical potential of The Feminine Mystique, that focus on its omissions, hesitations, and 
totalizing claims without an adequate engagement with its profound insights and subtle analyses.10   
Unintentionally, without a clear sense of where her argument led or could lead, Betty 
Friedan wrote a book about ideology-as-power.  For the purposes of this thesis, and for Friedan’s 
historical moment, the central insight of The Feminine Mystique is its elucidation of the ability of 
powerful social interests to shape the direction and flow of information about a socially 
disempowered group, and to shift the emphasis of this information when and where it suited their 
purposes.  Friedan’s pre-Foucauldian text made clear the decentralized, ubiquitous, and historically 
changeable nature of ideology-as-power; it revealed the interpenetration of individual and societal 
tendencies towards hegemonic gender and familial conservatism.  Her description of how social 
scientists, business interests, and other shapers of public opinion exerted enormous force to keep 
women tied to The [implicitly white, Protestant, middle- and upper-class] Home called into 
question the very nature of knowledge itself, revealing it to be, if not purely a historical construct, 
then liable to ideological exploitation in the service of dominant social structures.  The Feminine 
Mystique anticipates the later insight of the New Left Marxist-influenced scholar Douglas Hay: “An 
                                                
10 Such accounts include bell hooks [Gloria Watkins], Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston: South End 
Press, 1984; New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, an imprint of Informa PLC], 2015), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=L1WvBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&dq=bell+hooks+betty+friedan&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0a
hUKEwjQ6br5hp_XAhVDRiYKHRYbB_IQ6AEINjAC#v=onepage&q=bell%20hooks%20betty%20friedan&f=false: 
“Feminism in the United States has never emerged from the women who are most victimized by sexist oppression … The 
Feminine Mystique … was written as if these women did not exist … Friedan’s famous phrase, ‘the problem that has no 
name,’ often quoted to describe the condition of women in this society, actually referred to the plight of a select group of 
college-educated, middle- and upper-class, married white women.”  hooks, Feminist Theory, 1. Rachel Bowlby in “‘The 
Problem with No Name’: Rereading Friedan’s ‘The Feminine Mystique,’” Feminist Review 27 (Autumn 1987): 61-75, 
JSTOR, reevaluates The Feminine Mystique as a text whose “contradictions in … models of the self, of free choice and 
femininity leave all kinds of questions unresolved,” but even Bowlby does not recognize Friedan as a critic of ideology 
per se.  Bowlby, “‘The Problem with No Name,’” 74. 
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ideology endures not by being wholly enforced and rigidly defined.  Its effectiveness lies first in its 
very elasticity … [and] the fact that it seems to [men] the products of their own minds and their 
own experience.”11  We can extend this insight to recognize, as Marx did, that ideology is an 
instrument of political and social power in the hands of ruling classes, used to pre-empt criticism of 
and obscure alternatives to unjust practices precisely because those classes have power over what 
Marx calls “the means of mental production” and can therefore impose their vision of reality on 
society at large.12  The Feminine Mystique makes the crucial point that however comfortable, however 
“natural,” however desirable the life of a post-World War II white middle-class housewife may seem, 
it has a Janus face of foreclosed options, squelched talents, and general malaise.   
A number of scholars have used the term “ideology” to describe the book’s critical evaluation 
of social norms.  Sociologist Dorothy Smith noted the specific engagement of Friedan with the 
concept of ideology in her 1987 book The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology: 
“[Friedan] [made] central the critique of ideologies at work in our everyday lives … [she] unveiled 
the ideological nature of the ‘values,’ ‘norms,’ and ‘beliefs’ concerning women's role and the relations 
between the sexes, which we had taken for granted even as we had struggled with the divergence 
                                                
11 Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law,” in Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-
Century England, by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow (New York: 
Pantheon Books [Random House, Inc., an imprint of RCA], 1975), 55. 
12 Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. 
Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets, in Marx & Engels Collected Works, Volume 
V: Marx & Engels 1845-47, ed. Jack Cohen, Maurice Cornforth, Maurice Dobb, E.J. Hobsbawm, James Klugmann, 
Margaret Mynatt, James S. Allen et al. (Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 59, 
http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engles/Marx%20&%20Engels%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%205_%20
Ma%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf.  The paragraph in which the term “means of mental production” appears reads thus: 
“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society 
is at the same time its ruling intellectual force.  The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, 
consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental 
production are on the whole subject to it.  The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant 
material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the 
ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.”  Marx, “The German Ideology,” 59.  For more on Marx, see my 
discussion of him in relation to the work of Friedan and Mitchell below. 
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between the normative and the actually practiced.”13  Stephanie Coontz in her 2011 book A Strange 
Stirring: The Feminine Mystique and American Women at the Dawn of the 1960s also notes that 
“Friedan was highly effective in exposing the contradictions in [Freudian anti-feminist] ideology.”14  
In her 2006 book When Sex Became Gender, Shira Tarrant claims that the work of a “cohort” of 
postwar feminist writers – she names Margaret Mead, sociologists Viola Klein and Mirra 
Komarovsky, Ruth Herschberger, and Simone de Beauvoir – evinced “methodological parallels … 
[with] political theorists more broadly, particularly in regard to critiques of positivism, ideology, and 
presupposed knowledge.”15  I shall attempt to demonstrate that this is true of The Feminine Mystique 
– and Mitchell’s Women: the Longest Revolution – as well.  My intention is to go beyond these 
historians’ somewhat cursory examinations of ideology as a second-wave feminist concept, and to re-
evaluate the works of Friedan and Mitchell as, first and foremost, ideology critiques.   
For the purposes of this thesis, I will divide Friedan’s and Mitchell’s critiques into three parts 
– analysis of the intellectual and emotional work performed by hegemonic gender ideology, analysis 
of its relationship to ideas of progress and temporality, and analysis of contradictions as the source of 
its power.  I will evaluate the critiques using the mutually constitutive variations on the concept of 
ideology promulgated by Marx, French communist Louis Althusser, and Foucault, as described by 
                                                
13 Dorothy E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 
1987), 50, Social Theory.  
14 Stephanie Coontz, A Strange Stirring: The Feminine Mystique and American Women at the Dawn of the 1960s (New 
York: Basic Books [Perseus Books Group]), 2011), 162, Kindle. 
15 Shira Tarrant, When Sex Became Gender, Perspectives on Gender (New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, an 
imprint of Informa PLC], 2006), 21.  For more on Mead, see Friedan’s criticisms of her described below; for more on 
Klein, see her book The Feminine Character: History of an Ideology, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1946; 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971), in which she explicitly states her use of a framework emphasizing the 
“Sociology of Knowledge”; see Klein, The Feminine Character, 2-3.  For more on Komarovsky, see her book Women in 
the Modern World: Their Education and Dilemmas (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), quoted below in 
Coontz, A Strange Stirring, and criticized by Friedan as accommodating the feminine mystique; see Betty Friedan, The 
Feminine Mystique: 50th Anniversary Edition, ed. Kirsten Fermaglich and Lisa M. Fine, Norton Critical Editions (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2013), 110-11.  For more on Ruth Herschberger, see her book Adam’s Rib (New York: 
Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1948), quoted below.  For more on de Beauvoir, see Juliet Mitchell’s summations and my quotes 
of The Second Sex below. 
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British social workers Malcolm Carey and Victoria Foster in their article “Social work, ideology, and 
the limits of post-hegemony.”16  Marx, in Carey and Foster’s words, saw ideology as “[inverting] our 
understandings of a materially determined political economy upon which inequitable social relations 
are established and maintained [emphasis in the original]”17; Althusser refined this concept with his 
distinction between “[r]epressive” and “ideological” state apparatuses, thus “[privileging] the role of 
civil society in generating an imaginary or illusionary relationship between people and their 
conditions of existence”18; and Foucault shifted the emphasis to the role of “discourse formation(s) 
and their capacity to create professional statements, concepts and strategies (within medicine, social 
work, education, and so on) that situate speakers, and position, subjugate or elevate social actors 
through codes of language that determine what can and cannot be said, as well as influencing more 
general perception and understanding [emphasis in the original].”19  These views of ideology enable 
us to understand what was so revolutionary about the work of Friedan and Mitchell.  My account of 
                                                
16 Malcolm Carey and Victoria Foster, “Social work, ideology, discourse and the limits of post-hegemony,” Journal of 
Social Work 13, no. 3 (2013): 248-66, SAGE Journals.  
17 Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 250. 
18 Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 250.  British New Left theorist Stuart Hall in his 1985 article “Signification, 
Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2, no. 2 
(June 1985): 91-114, EBSCO Publishing, notes that one of Althusser’s core propositions is “the insistence that ideology 
is practice.  That is, it appears in practices located within the rituals of specific apparatuses or social institutions and 
organizations … Ideologies are the frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world – the ‘ideas’ which people 
use to figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to do … Althusser … places 
the emphasis on where ideas appear, where mental events register or are realized, as social phenomena [emphasis in the 
original].”  The term “social phenomena,” in my view, is crucial for understanding ideology as a phenomenon of broad 
cultural significance.  Hall, “Signification, Representation, Ideology,” 99.  For more on Althusser, see my discussion of 
him in relation to Friedan’s and Mitchell’s work below. 
19 Carey and Foster, “Social work,” 251.  Foucault in his landmark The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books [Random House, Inc., an imprint of Advance Publications, Inc.], 
1990), pointed out that since power in any society is diffuse and multifaceted, there is correspondingly “no single locus 
of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.  Instead there is a plurality of 
resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, 
savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by 
definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.”  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95-96.  This 
insight of Foucault’s is central to understanding the evolution of resistant social movements and their arguments.  For 
more on Foucault, see my discussion of him in relation to the work of Friedan and Mitchell below. 
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Friedan’s critique will rely both on original drafts of The Feminine Mystique and the final published 
version of the text. 
I. Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Intellectual-Emotional Work 
The Feminine Mystique’s legendary opening sentence – “The problem lay buried, unspoken, for 
many years in the minds of American women”20 – strikingly illustrates the truth of Sally Haslanger’s 
contention that “[o]ne crucial task of ideology critique is to reveal ideology as such [emphasis 
added].”21  Friedan employs a fairly similar, if more extended, metaphor in her description of 
changes in the portrayal of heroines in women’s magazines over a 20-year period: “A geologist brings 
up a core of mud from the bottom of the ocean and sees layers of sediment as sharp as a razor blade 
deposited over the years – clues to changes in the geological evolution of the earth.”22  Buried, brings 
up, bottom, sediment, deposited – these are striking metaphors to describe that facet of ideology 
critique in which, in Haslanger’s words, “it is necessary to articulate [ideology] and make it accessible 
for critical reflection.”23  The implication is that Friedan is a kind of explorer, a pioneer.  On page 23 
she writes, “[The] women I have talked to, who are finally listening to [their] inner voice, seem in 
some incredible way to be groping through to a truth that has defied the experts.  I think the experts 
in a great many fields have been holding pieces of that truth under their microscopes for a long time 
without realizing it.”24  With images of touch struggling through thickly-layered substances – 
bringing up a core of mud, groping through – Friedan testifies to the socially-constructed nature of 
“truth” and the enormous obstacles to understanding the particular “truth” she struggles to impress 
                                                
20 Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 9. 
21 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19.  
22 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 28, 28-36. 
23 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19. 
24 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 23. 
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on her readers.  Friedan’s book itself contains a substratum of buried, fragmented Marxist-influenced 
insights. 
“[One] goal of ideology critique,” writes Haslanger, “is to elucidate the conceptual and narrative 
frameworks that undergird our social interaction, thus making them available for critical 
examination.”25  What is important for this thesis is the multipronged nature of Friedan’s attempt to 
“dissect the morning mist” – a phrase originally used by 19th-century British economist Harriet 
Martineau in her criticism of the idea of women’s “influence” as a legitimate substitute for political 
power.26  Friedan is keenly attuned to the power of words and their construction:  “The image [of 
femininity dominant in US society],” she writes in an early draft of The Feminine Mystique, “has the 
power to create mindless women, since words are what the mind grows on.”27  Thus she examines a 
wide variety of printed texts – fiction and nonfiction in women’s magazines, advertisements, social-
scientific and psychoanalytic writings – and establishes points of continuity between them; in other 
words, she establishes them as forms of ideological work.  Both the published and unpublished 
versions of The Feminine Mystique grapple with the problem of how to unveil and challenge 
assumptions largely unchallenged.  Friedan’s early drafts of The Feminine Mystique, as we will see, 
often go more deeply into the psychological roots of hegemonic gender ideology than does the 
book’s final, published version. 
Friedan’s understanding of the economic basis of the feminine mystique – her Marxist-
influenced delineation of the social forces converging to trap women in a domestic future, to 
paraphrase Sara Pursley in her 2012 dissertation “A Race Against Time: Governing Femininity and 
                                                
25 Haslanger, Resisting Reality, 19. 
26 Harriet Martineau, Society in America, vol. I (London: Saunders and Otley, 1837), 
http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/DSS/Martineau/v1p1c3s7.html. 
27 Betty Friedan, draft of The Feminine Mystique, p. 186, Series III, Box 44, Folder 580, Betty Friedan Papers, Radcliffe 
Institute, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
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Reproducing the Future in Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-1963”28 – underwrites her critique of its 
overwhelming emotional and intellectual power.  The “richness of honest, objective, concrete, 
realistic domestic detail – the color of walls or lipstick, the exact temperature of the oven” found in 
the “service article”29 of women’s magazines, the “increasing mindlessness, increasing emphasis on 
things … [forces] the men who make the images to see women only as thing-buyers.”30  Friedan’s 
startlingly blunt coda to this build-up of insights is that “the really crucial function, the really 
important role that women serve as housewives is to buy more things for the house.  In all the talk of 
femininity and woman’s role, one forgets that the real business of America is business.  But the 
perpetuation of housewifery, the growth of the feminine mystique, makes sense (and dollars) when 
one realizes that women are the chief customers of American business [emphasis in the original].”31  
It is not out of place to note that Calvin Coolidge, who coined the phrase “the business of America is 
business,” embodied the Puritan-influenced Protestant Ethic more than any other US president in 
the first half of the 20th century. 
In the Marxist schema, as noted above, ideologies are underwritten by economic conditions.   
Friedan exposes the class basis of cultural prescriptions for full-time domesticity by analyzing the 
variety of economic-aesthetic desires women’s magazines arouse in their readers.  One Texas 
housewife, in a story revealingly titled “‘How America Lives,’” “‘sits on a pale aqua satin sofa gazing 
out her picture window … wearing rouge, powder, and lipstick … her cotton dress … immaculately 
fresh.’”32  Janice, presumably white and upper-middle-class, is, in her own words, “‘free to play 
                                                
28 Sara Pursley, “A Race Against Time: Governing Femininity and Reproducing the Future in Revolutionary Iraq, 1945-
63” (Ph.D diss., CUNY Graduate Center, 2012), 11, 20, 
http://library.gc.cuny.edu.central.ezproxy.cuny.edu:2048/legacy/items/show/13655. 
29 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 44, 43. 
30 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 52-53. 
31 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 173. 
32 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 51. 
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bridge, attend club meetings, or stay home and read, listen to Beethoven, and just plain loaf … I 
love my home … I’m so grateful for my blessings … [my] big comfortable house … good health and 
faith in God and such material possessions as two cars, two TV’s [sic] and two fireplaces.’”33  Good 
health, faith in God, two cars, two TVs, two fireplaces – this is, of course, the embodiment of the 
Protestant Ethic’s marriage of material wealth and “eternal verities” sentimentalism.  A later 
observation in “The Sexual Sell,” Friedan’s chapter on the advertising industry’s manipulation of 
women’s consumption habits, quotes an advertiser’s report on “[a] new combination of an almost 
religious belief in the importance and beauty of married life on the one hand, and the product-
centered outlook, on the other[.]”34 
More pointedly, Friedan’s biting apothegm about “Housewife Writers” Jean Kerr, Shirley 
Jackson, and Phyllis McGinley – their comic writings “may or may not overlook the housekeeper or 
maid who really makes the beds”35 – and her quote from an advertiser’s report in “The Sexual Sell” – 
“‘housekeeping … is a task for which society hires the lowliest, least-trained, most trod-upon 
individuals and groups’”36 – anticipate what would later become a crucial insight of feminist 
historians: the US Cult of Domesticity, from the 18th through the 20th centuries, was underwritten 
by the easy access of white women in comfortable circumstances to low-paid domestic service, often 
provided by African-Americans and other racialized minority groups.37  The racial-economic 
interests of white men and women had underwritten their belief in a subordinate role for the latter.  
Following Marxist historian Eleanor Flexner, Friedan also notes that, during the struggle for 
                                                
33 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 51-52. 
34 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 184; see also 183-84, 174-84. 
35 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 45. 
36 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 180; see also 174-80. 
37 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 44, 45.  For broader accounts of the intersection of race, gender, and class hierarchies 
in the development of US domestic ideology, see Ruth Feldstein, Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in 
American Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 5, 7, and Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Forced to Care: Coercion 
and Caregiving in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 24-29, 35-36. 
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women’s suffrage, “[b]ehind the cries of ‘save femininity,’ ‘save the home,’ could … be glimpsed the 
influence of political machines, quailing at the very thought of what … women would do if they got 
the vote … [brewers] as well as other business interests, especially those that depended on underpaid 
labor of children and women, openly lobbied against the woman’s suffrage amendment.”38  As 
Jessica Weiss notes in her 2012 article “‘Fraud of Femininity’: Domesticity, Selflessness, and 
Individualism in Responses to Betty Friedan,”39 about responses to Friedan’s McCall’s excerpt from 
The Feminine Mystique in March 1963, “[t]hose who identified women with the home and 
capitalism saw them as the glue that held the family together.”40  
Several short but tantalizing moments in Friedan’s early drafts of The Feminine Mystique point to 
the intersection of race, class, and gender as categories of social hierarchy.  In the first reference, 
Friedan connects the socially-imposed ignorance of white Southern women to their virulent racism: 
“The mind [sic] of the New Orleans women, shrieking, cursing, spitting at the little Negro girls 
entering school, was [sic] created partly by the ideas they were never given, [sic] to read about.  But 
where does the violence come from, in these feminine Southern housewife [sic], in those other happy 
housewives who stormed in such fury at [a Black girl integrating a school]?”41 The implication here is 
that sexist limitations help to reinforce racism; the Southern white woman’s world is shrunk by editors 
writing for a female audience assumed to be white and middle-class.  Editors are, in the published 
version of The Feminine Mystique, “truncating women’s minds.”42  In a later chapter, Friedan points 
to women of the US past as examples of “[strength] and independence, work and responsibility, self-
                                                
38 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 82; see also 82 fn. 15, 315. 
39 Jessica Weiss, “‘Fraud of Femininity’: Domesticity, Selflessness, and Individualism in Responses to Betty Friedan,” 
in Liberty and Justice for All?: Rethinking Politics in Cold War America, edited by Kathleen G. Donohue (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2012), 124-54, JSTOR. 
40 Weiss, “‘Fraud of Femininity,’” 137. 
41 Friedan, draft, p. 186. 
42 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 53. 
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confidence, self-discipline, courage – freedom and equality … the New England settlers, the 
westward pioneers, and the mothers and daughters who came in the steerage from Ireland and Italy, 
Russia and Poland, or as slaves from Africa, and worked in the sweatshops or the laundries [emphasis 
added].”43  In the published version of this latter passage, “slaves from Africa” is omitted, for reasons 
that are not clear.44 
The Feminine Mystique’s lack of an extended, sophisticated analysis of racism is one of the book’s 
major problems, as many commentators have noted.45  But to adequately understand why this is the 
case, we need to grasp Friedan’s larger point about the conservative political and social climate 
following the psychological dislocations of the Great Depression and World War II.  “The uncritical 
acceptance of Freudian doctrine in America was caused, at least in part, by the very relief it provided 
from uncomfortable questions about objective realities … It provided a convenient escape from the 
atom bomb, McCarthy, all the disconcerting problems that might spoil the taste of steaks,”46 she 
writes, at a time when the Red Scare was still very much alive.  “It was easier” in the postwar era, 
“safer, to think about love and sex than about communism, McCarthy, and the uncontrolled bomb 
… easier to look for Freudian sexual roots in man’s behavior, his ideas, and his wars than to look 
critically at his society and act constructively to right its wrongs.”47  Even social scientists, Friedan 
writes in an unpublished draft, make “a deliberate conscious choice [to insist that] regardless of the 
truth, regardless of the human possibilities, it is better not to move ahead [underline in the 
                                                
43 Friedan, draft, p. 290, Box 44, Folder 580. 
44 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 278.  Coontz notes in A Strange Stirring that “in at least one case” during the 1950s, 
women’s magazines “removed favorable references [in Friedan’s submitted articles] to struggles against racial and 
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46 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 103. 
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original]”;48 for Friedan, this is an abuse of social science, the purpose of which is to challenge 
cultural norms rather than reinforce them.  The psychological and sociological model of 
functionalism, “an attempt to make social science more ‘scientific’ by … studying an institution only 
in terms of its function within its own society … to avert unscientific value judgments,”49 was “an 
easy out … [from] the need to formulate questions and answers that would be inevitably 
controversial (at a time in academic circles, as in America as a whole, when controversy was not 
welcome.”50  Ideology can function simply by making certain questions and answers invisible.  A 
climate of paranoia shades inexorably into a climate of intellectual and emotional brainwashing.   
The ideological work of educators “more concerned with their students’ future capacity for 
sexual orgasm than with their future use of trained intelligence”51 is effective precisely because it 
plays on the combination of intellectual and emotional prohibitions women students have inherited.  
Friedan quotes psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch’s fatwa against women’s intelligence – “‘the 
intellectual woman is masculinized; in her warm, intuitive knowledge has yielded to cold 
unproductive thinking’” – and adds the devastating observation: “A girl doesn’t have to be very lazy, 
very unsure, to take the hint … she would have to do some very cold hard thinking about her own 
warm, intuitive knowledge to challenge this authoritative statement.”52  This deconstruction of a 
leading woman psychoanalyst’s opposition to the intellectual development of other women is one of 
the most brilliant exposés of ideological work in the brilliant exposé that is The Feminine Mystique.  
A statement like Deutsch’s has the power to disarm all possible resistance, to foreclose all suspicion 
of the status quo.  What cultural forces are so invested in the disempowerment of a social group that 
                                                
48 Friedan, draft, p. 491, Box 45, Folder 583a. 
49 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 106. 
50 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 112. 
51 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 131. 
52 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 145 fn. 19, 316, 318. 
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even its “educators … [protect] [them] from the temptation to use their critical, creative intelligence 
– by the ingenious method of educating it not to be critical or creative[?]”53  
II. Hegemonic Gender Ideology, Progress,  and Temporality 
“Certainly, all the words written for American women today, telling them how to adjust to their 
role as women … assume this is the end.  In the women’s magazines – read by tens of millions of 
American women, reflecting, and shaping, their identity, their dreams, and the horizon of their 
world, this is woman, as she was, and is, and will be [underline in the original],” writes Friedan in an 
unpublished draft of The Feminine Mystique.54  “I do not think,” she writes on the next page of the 
draft, “this image is the end – women [sic] as she is and was and always will be – for the fact is that 
this image has changed, even in the past 20 years, and is still changing … [but] … this image … 
denies the actuality of changing life [underline in the original].”55  Change does not automatically 
equal progress.  “My generation of women grew up, already so different, that we felt no need to fight 
battles for women … No one told us of the gap between winning freedom, and using it,”56 she writes 
in the draft.  To a certain extent Friedan’s observations chime with those of Martin Luther King in 
his iconic Letter from a Birmingham Jail, published the same year: “time itself is neutral … [human] 
progress never rolls in on the wheels of inevitability … without … hard work, time itself becomes an 
ally of the forces of social stagnation.”57 
Chapter 2 of Friedan’s book is designed to claim the Great Depression as a time when white, 
middle-class women’s confinement to domesticity did not seem immutable; when career aspirations 
                                                
53 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 131. 
54 Friedan, draft, page 180, Series III, Box 44, Folder 580. 
55 Friedan, draft, page 181. 
56 Friedan, draft, pp. 327-28, Folder 581. 
57 Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," 1963, African Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, 
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for women were not condemned as they were in the postwar era.58  In actual fact, many countries 
around the world had curtailed women’s employment opportunities during the Great Depression – 
and the windows of opportunity for entry into “male” fields opened by World War II had closed 
when the war ended.59  But for the purposes of this thesis, the point is not to condemn Friedan for 
her deviation from historical accuracy, but to see the creativity and ingenuity of her point that the 
postwar domestic ideal was a historical development and not a biological or social necessity.  The 
troubled aftermath of a depression and a war was the backdrop for “avoiding personal commitment 
to truth in a catch-all commitment to ‘home’ and ‘family.’  For the social worker, the psychologist 
and the numerous ‘family’ counselors … therapy for private patients on personal problems of sex, 
personality, and interpersonal relations was safer and more lucrative than probing too deeply for the 
common causes of mankind’s suffering.”60 “Under the Freudian microscope … a very different 
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hostility.”  Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 155-56.  For more on postwar discrimination against women in Europe, see 
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(New York: Routledge [Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, an imprint of Informa PLC]), 2012, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=7PvIBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bonnie+smith+regulska&hl=en&sa=X
&ved=0ahUKEwisrITJmJLYAhXE1CYKHZD0BBcQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=bonnie%20smith%20regulska&f=fal
se.  Smith notes that postwar Western Europe as a whole “hoped to get women out of the workforce” and that the odd 
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concept of family began to emerge … singled out for special attention was the ‘mother.’  It was 
suddenly discovered that the mother could be blamed for almost everything … By unfortunate 
coincidence, this attack against mothers came about at [sic] the same time that American women 
were beginning to use the rights of their emancipation.”61  Here, as we will see in the following 
chapter, Friedan anticipates Juliet Mitchell’s claim that the family is an ideological and not a natural 
structure.   
As historian Rebecca Jo Plant has noted in her book Mom: The Transformation of Motherhood in 
Modern America, Friedan at once reproduces and challenges the misogynistic claims made by 
psychoanalysis and social science about white, middle-class women as mothers.62  For this thesis, the 
insight can be modified into the claim that Friedan’s arguments both reify and question ideologies of 
the normal family.  Friedan’s book reflects a tension that Rebecca Jo Plant has identified in postwar 
ideologies of motherhood: “despite their tendency to portray maternal instinct in biological terms, 
experts betrayed profound doubts about middle-class women’s ‘natural’ capacities as nurturers.”63  
Although Friedan does not articulate a coherent argument for the historical changeability of the 
concept of motherhood itself, she makes it clear that the forms of social reproduction predominant 
in the postwar United States are not final or natural, but historically conditioned.   
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In evaluating Freud’s work, Friedan makes perhaps her most explicit social-constructionist and 
relativist claim: “no social scientist can completely free himself from the prison of his own culture: he 
can only interpret what he observes in the scientific framework of his own time … Much of what 
Freud believed to be biological, instinctual, and changeless has been shown by modern research to be 
a result of specific cultural causes.”64  In this she echoes the earlier emphasis of psychoanalyst Karen 
Horney – and Freud himself in his later years – on the significance of environmental influences in 
the formation of personality; Horney had claimed in 1939 that ‘[t]he relevant factor[s] in the genesis 
of neurosis [are] … adverse influences which make a child feel helpless and defenseless.”65  (Friedan 
quotes Horney at the beginning of Chapter 13, “The Forfeited Self,” as an example of a thinker who 
“postulate[s] some positive growth tendency within the organism, which, from within, drives it to 
fuller development, to self-realization.”)66  Freud’s alleged belief in eating as a major indicator of 
conflict between mother and child, for example, is challenged by Friedan: “a noticeable decline in 
children’s ‘eating problems’ … has the culture removed eating as a focus for early childhood 
problems – by the American emphasis on permissiveness in child care, or simply by the fact that in 
our affluent society food has become less a cause for anxiety in mothers?”67  Friedan’s quote of a 
sociologist’s claim that “‘[modern] ‘scientific child care’ enforces a constant supervision and diffused 
worrying … in an intensely competitive milieu middle-class parents from the day of birth are 
constantly comparing their own child’s development with that of the neighbors’ children’”68 opens 
dominant US ideals of childrearing to critical scrutiny.  The very “glorification of ‘woman’s role’ … 
seems to be in proportion to society’s reluctance to treat women as complete human beings; for the 
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less real function that role has, the more it is decorated with meaningless details to conceal its emptiness.  
This phenomenon has been noted, in general terms, in the annals of social science and history.”69  
Here, again, Friedan may have been influenced by Horney: “The restriction of woman to a private 
emotional sphere leads to inferiority feelings,” said Horney in a speech to the National Federation of 
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs in July 1935, “because a sound and secure self-confidence 
must draw on a broad basis of human qualities – such as initiative, courage, independence, capacity 
for mastering situations, talents … [a]s long as homemaking was a big task with plenty of 
responsibilities … woman knew that she was a constructive factor in the economic process … With 
the change in social conditions, woman has lost one important foundation for feeling herself 
valuable.”70 
Friedan devotes a segment of “The Sex-Directed Educators” to challenging several implicit 
premises of “‘family-life education’”71: “It is functional ‘knowledge’ that ‘only the exceptional 
woman can make a go of a commitment to a career.  Of course, since most women in the past have 
not had careers, the few who did were all ‘exceptional.’”72  In criticizing Margaret Mead for her 
“vision … [that] women, by merely being women and bearing children, will earn the same respect 
accorded men for their creative achievements,” Friedan notes that “[in] such a world … [femininity] 
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becomes a value which society must protect from the destructive onrush of civilization like the 
vanishing buffalo.”73  Biology itself is not outside history: “Female biology … may be changeless … 
but the nature of the human relationship to biology has changed … Even … simple [biological needs 
of hunger, thirst, and sex] in men or women today, are not the same as they were in the Stone Age or 
in the South Sea cultures.”74  Belief in biology as destiny actually contributes to a “high incidence of 
cramps with menstruation, nausea and vomiting during pregnancy, depression with childbirth, and 
severe physiological and psychological distress at menopause[,] [which] have come to be accepted as 
a ‘normal’ part of feminine biology.  Are these stigmata … part of the fixed and eternal nature of 
women as they are popularly assumed to be?”75  We see here, and in analysis of Mead’s writings 
quoted below, how Friedan shows up the timidity, instability, and vacillation of Mead’s writings on 
gender roles – how Friedan points out Mead’s oscillation between viewing women as creatures of 
(seemingly timeless) biology and creatures of (alterable) environment.   
Friedan’s close reading of Mead explores the role played by the idea of progress in Western social 
thought.  The concept of progress – and its obstruction – forms a major theme in Friedan’s critique.  
“To live according to the feminine mystique depends on a reversal of history, a devaluation of 
human progress … even the mystique makers felt the need to defend themselves against the 
question, ‘are we, in suggesting that women might … recapture some of their functions around the 
home … trying to turn back the clock of progress?’ Progress is not progress, they argued.”76  In 
“Stepford U.S.A.: Second-Wave Feminism, Domestic Labor, and the Representation of National 
Time,” Jane Elliott argues that The Feminine Mystique “consistently argues that women’s oppression 
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is experienced primarily as a temporal problem … [s]tuck in the same repetitive drudgery, 
[housewives] trudge through the ‘endless boring days’ that constitute static time.”77  The paradox of 
progress-stasis is one of many functional contradictions of the feminine mystique. 
III. Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Althusserian Dialectics 
“Instead of destroying the old prejudices that restricted women’s lives, [postwar] social science in 
America merely gave them new authority.  By a curious circular process, the insights of psychology 
and anthropology and sociology, which should have been powerful weapons to free women, 
somehow canceled each other out, trapping women in dead center,” writes Friedan [emphasis 
added].78  Friedan employs a variant of the Hegelian-Marxist concept of “supersession” (“the 
maintenance-of-what-has-been-negated-in-its-very-negation” [emphasis in the original], to quote 
Althusser in his 1965 book For Marx) to explain the survival of conservative gender ideology in an 
ostensibly democratic society.79  Her close reading of the work of Margaret Mead and other social 
theorists reveals how easily egalitarian social-scientific language can be redirected from emancipatory 
ends to maintain an uneasy status quo – which, of course, makes it all the more bewildering.  As 
Stephanie Coontz notes in A Strange Stirring, “Postwar ideology was particularly disorienting for 
many women because it often came in the guise of a forward-thinking rejection of ‘traditional’ ideas 
about gender and sexuality.”80  Indeed, as Friedan herself notes, “the feminine mystique itself – with 
its acknowledgement of woman as subject and not just object of the sexual act, and its assumption 
that her active, willing participation was essential to man’s pleasure – could not have come without 
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the [partial] emancipation of women to human equality.”81  Friedan illustrates how easily ideologies 
and discourses of emancipation can be deployed in the service of new forms of oppression.  She also 
illustrates the extent to which emancipation itself can be given with one hand and taken away with 
the other, how it can function as the more “positive” side of a coin of social control. 
Friedan’s criticism of Margaret Mead, the “Housewife Writers,” and other women who shape 
public opinion in the direction of the feminine mystique is extraordinarily subtle and incisive, 
profoundly attuned to their own troubled subject positions as women in a male-dominated world.  
In Chapter 2, “The Happy Housewife Heroine,” Friedan points to the paradox of Dorothy 
Thompson, “newspaper woman, foreign correspondent, famous columnist,” telling readers of the 
Ladies’ Home Journal they “can save more money by their managerial talents inside the home than 
they can bring into it by outside work.”82  Women writers and professionals serve as a buffer class, 
their privilege of work outside the home resting on the domestic containment of other women: “If 
the real women editors [of women’s magazines] were not, somehow, able to give up their own 
careers, all the more reason to ‘help’ other women fulfill themselves as wives and mothers.”83  In one 
of her unpublished drafts Friedan speculates, “It may not be relevant [Friedan seems to think that 
the word “relevant” does as well as the word “irrelevant” for clarifying her point], whether a 
brilliantly successful woman in a science dominated by men wanted her singular stature diminished 
by the influx of a lot of other women into such fields … the role of Margaret Mead as the 
professional spokesman [sic] of femininity would have been less important, if more women moved 
                                                
81 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 274. 
82 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 31, 32, 31-32.  This, of course, is yet another example of how ideology functions in a 
Marxist sense as an instrument of ruling-class economic interests; Thompson assumes that her readers have the option 
not to work outside the home. 
83 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 44. 
 25 
on … to take their own place on the frontiers of thought … instead of listening to what [Mead] said 
in her books.”84 
As we have already seen, Friedan recognizes in the published text that Mead’s “influence, for 
women, has been a paradox.  A mystique takes what it needs from any thinker of the time [emphasis 
added]”85 – in other words, it exploits the ambiguities, retreats, and hesitations embedded in 
“liberal,” “emancipatory” ideologies and makes them “[cancel] each other out.”  Friedan quotes 
Mead’s acknowledgement that the “‘great variety of ways … in which the roles of the two sexes have 
been patterned’” are often “‘flatly contradictory to each other,” but Mead turns around to claim that 
“we always find the patterning … Are we dealing with a [biological, social, and/or cultural 
requirement] that … although not so deeply rooted, still is so very socially convenient and so well 
tried that it would be uneconomical to flout it?’”86  I would argue that Friedan’s quote of Mead’s 
intellectual contortions shows how gender conservatism can function by fusing with or balancing 
“feminist” language, in the dialectical sense of contradictions and inconsistencies “[canceling] each 
other out.”  I think this point is further illustrated when Friedan quotes Mead’s claim that the 
“‘tendency to make artificial definitions that limit an activity to one sex … is a vicious circle … 
[those] who would break the circle are themselves a product of it, express some of its defects in their 
every gesture, may only be strong enough to challenge it, not able actually to break it.’”87  The very 
caution of Mead’s language, her vacillations, her inconsistencies, strengthens the feminine mystique.  
Friedan captures a central paradox of liberal discourse: its potential both to reinforce and oppose 
structures of domination.   
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This is in part because of what Friedan calls the “therapeutic caution, the manipulative 
superiority, typical of too many American social scientists.”88  Recall that the “[feminine] mystique is 
broadcast by the very agents of education and social science that are supposed to be the chief enemies 
of prejudice.”89  Postwar psychoanalysis and social science were mutually reinforcing in their 
pronouncements on women’s appropriate nature and role.90  Friedan’s “sex-directed educator,” 
influenced by both fields of study, a product of the modernizing optimism of the postwar United 
States, feeds his students “a sophisticated soup of uncritical prescriptions and presentiments far more 
binding on the mind and prejudicial to the future than all the traditional do’s and don’ts.”91  
University education for US women, “as psychology and anthropology and sociology permeated the 
total scholarly atmosphere,” has, to use a piquant phrase of a woman quoted in the 1960 Redbook 
magazine article “Why Young Mothers Feel Trapped, “‘come full circle and the American housewife 
is once again trapped in a squirrel cage … the cage is now a modern plate-glass-and-broadloom 
ranch house or a convenient modern apartment.’”92  Friedan’s quote of the “‘squirrel cage’” 
                                                
88 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 121. 
89 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 86. 
90 See, for example, Coontz, A Strange Stirring; “psychiatrists explained [the naturalness of women’s domesticity and the 
unnaturalness of their rejection of it] in circular reasoning disguised as the latest scientific thinking … [s]ociologists 
argued that unless society encouraged a clear differentiation of the sexes, everything from the nuclear family to the 
economy itself could disintegrate.”  Coontz, A Strange Stirring, 68-69.  Eli Zaretsky in his fascinating 2004 article 
“Charisma or Rationalization? Domesticity and Psychoanalysis in the United States in the 1950s,” Critical Inquiry 26, 
no. 2 (Winter, 2000): 328-54, JSTOR, notes that by the post-World War II period psychoanalysis “was becoming a this-
worldly program of ethical rationalization, with links to such normalizing agencies as medicine, the social service 
professions, the social sciences, and the welfare state.”  It was, in other words, part of a general regime of what Zaretsky 
calls “‘social control,’” which included “the growth of the professions not only because professionals supplied a model of 
autonomous collegial organization, but also because they generated the necessary techniques of planning, classification, 
and ordering.”  Social control was a society-wide phenomenon; in Zaretsky’s words, it “pervaded the military, the 
workplace, the welfare state, and the professions … the resanctification of domesticity and the accompanying 
familialization of personal life were aspects of rationalization.  The result was to destroy preexisting communities and 
group solidarities and to create new, bureaucratically and instrumentally organized forms of order – psychiatry, medicine, 
the welfare state, the multiversity, the military.” Zaretsky, “Charisma or Rationalization?,” 333, 341.  Gender 
conservatism was so pervasive in the postwar era because processes of homogenization and modernization cut across 
different sectors of US society. 
91 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 132.   
92 Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, 132, 20 fn. 4, 314. 
 27 
metaphor indicates that the difficulty of challenging the boundaries of the feminine mystique lies 
precisely in the modernity of the social-scientific and psychoanalytic doctrines that buttress it.  
“Freud’s concept of the superego helped to free man from the tyranny of the ‘shoulds,’ the tyranny 
of the past … [y]et Freudian thought helped create a new superego that paralyzes educated modern 
American women – a new tyranny of the ‘shoulds,’ which chains women to an old image, prohibits 
choice and growth, and denies them individual identity.”93  Friedan was not, of course, the first 
person to realize that the language of freedom and progress can have an underside of repression and 
stagnation.  In her 1949 polemic Adam’s Rib Ruth Herschberger responded to psychoanalyst Erich 
Fromm’s hope that “‘social conditions can be created which will develop the positive side of the 
peculiarities of persons, sexes, and national groups’”94 thus: “[there] is no rule by which we must 
develop only what we have ‘uniquely’ to offer … [the] progressive school with its admonition to ‘be 
creative’ often has preconceptions of what the creative is to be.  These premeditated potentialities are 
given a few years of grace in which to emerge, but if they have not come out of hiding by that time – 
back to the birch rod.”95   
The insidious uses to which the supposedly emancipatory, modernizing language of “creativity”96 
can be put are abundantly in evidence in Friedan’s book.  Friedan quotes a motivational research 
expert who claims that he has “helped [woman] rediscover the home as the expression of her 
creativeness … If [a manufacturer] tells [a woman] that all she can be is a wife and mother, she will 
spit in his face.  But we … liberate her need to be creative in the kitchen [emphasis added].”97  This 
statement is a masterful combination of a carrot and a stick; it entices women into the trap of Hansel 
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and Gretel’s gingerbread house.  “Liberation” is here used for conservative purposes.  In Friedan’s 
words, “[education], independence, growing individuality, everything that made [women] ready for 
other purposes had constantly to be countered, channeled back to the home.”98  In fact, claims an 
advertising publication, “‘[the] modern bride seeks as a conscious goal that which in many cases her 
grandmother saw as a blind fate and her mother as slavery: to belong to a man, to have a home and 
children of her own, to choose among all possible careers the career of wife-mother-homemaker 
[emphasis added].’”99  The language of consciousness and choice is here used to give the illusion of 
freedom.  The term “illusion,” in Friedan’s hands, signifies advertisers’ pre-emption of women’s 
desires for intelligence, independence, “creativity”; “a certain cleaning device … let the housewife 
have the illusion that she has become ‘a professional, an expert’”100; “Science should not relieve 
housewives of too much drudgery; it must concentrate instead on creating the illusion of that sense 
of achievement that housewives seem to need [emphasis in the original].”101   
Friedan and, later, Mitchell, imply but do not state that ideologies of modernity, of progress, of 
creativity, can themselves be obstacles to social justice.  The very claim that a society has solved a 
social inequality, or that a social inequality has become benign, is itself ideological work.  The 
ideology of housewifery-as-modernity promulgated by advertisers keeps white middle-class women 
ever more firmly in the home.  The very time that labor-saving devices and the rationalization of the 
US economy have permitted to women is given with one hand and taken away with the other.  As 
Friedan writes in the chapter “Housewifery Expands to Fill the Time Available,” “when the mystique 
of feminine fulfillment sent women back home again, housewifery had to expand into a full-time 
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career … each labor-saving appliance brought a labor-demanding elaboration of housework.  Each 
scientific advance that might have freed women from the drudgery of cooking, cleaning, and 
washing … instead imposed new drudgery, until housework not only expanded to fill the time 
available, but could hardly be done in the available time [emphasis added].”102  Women are trapped 
by the very wealth, the very devices, they are told to be grateful for. 
 The Feminine Mystique is thus a story of the totalitarian potential embedded in the 
supposedly emancipatory forces of industrialization, automation, mechanization, and social science.  
In Friedan’s telling, the freedom promised by modernity is premised on social control.  Queer 
theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s 1991 claim that “social-engineering momentum [is] apparently 
built into every one of the human sciences of the west” is also made, implicitly, by The Feminine 
Mystique nearly 30 years earlier.103  Friedan’s critique can be seen as an extension of German 
philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schutz’s earlier observation, quoted in Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann’s 1966 The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge: 
“‘All typifications of common-sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete 
historical socio-cultural Lebenswelt within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially 
approved.’”104  Friedan’s contribution to the “sociology of knowledge” is to expose the problems 
embedded in liberal ideologies of progress, to challenge totalizing assumptions of inevitable advance, 
even while, as Rachel Bowlby notes, she herself employs a “triumphalist rhetoric of emancipation.”105  
“The very twists of [Friedan’s] argument,” Bowlby recognizes, “with all the oddity of its details and 
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contradictions … makes problematic the easy conceptualization of feminist progress.”106  In Juliet 
Mitchell’s “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Friedan’s challenge is vastly extended and elaborated. 
Chapter 2  
“Women: the Longest Revolution”: Juliet Mitchell ’s  New Conceptual Paradigms 
 Where Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique advances somewhat tentative claims about 
connections between ideology and power, Juliet Mitchell’s 1966 article “Women: the Longest 
Revolution,” published in the British socialist New Left Review, clearly states the linkages.  Where 
Betty Friedan, writing for a mass-market audience in the Cold War United States, cannot explicitly 
refer to her Old Left roots or apply the theories of Marx or Engels to women’s situation,107 Mitchell 
grounds her feminist critique in Marxist historical materialism.  For Mitchell, the situation of 
women is governed by exploitative contradictions.  It is precarious and menaced even by 
developments – industrialization, automation, the birth-control pill – that are thought to promote it.  
Ironically for an essay published in a socialist journal and written with a Marxist framework, 
Mitchell does not pay attention to class differences in women’s roles or self-conceptions.  She 
examines the status of women as women and not as baronesses or factory workers.  “Women: the 
Longest Revolution” is a short and pointed political manifesto, an overview of problems arising from 
women’s situation, rather than a book-length exposé like The Feminine Mystique.108  What is 
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significant about the essay is not simply that she takes the necessity and desirability of women’s 
liberation for granted – not an automatic assumption even on the British Left in 1966 – but that she 
moves the parameters of the discussion to an entirely new level. 
 Like The Feminine Mystique, “Women: the Longest Revolution” is keenly attuned to the 
power relations embedded in dominant views of gender and sexuality.  But where Friedan’s critique 
of ideology-as-power is mainly implicit and indirect, Mitchell openly states that “there is nothing 
inevitable about the form or role of the family any more than there is about the character or role of 
women.  It is the function of ideology to present these given social types as aspects of Nature itself 
[emphasis added].”109  This forthrightly radical statement differs profoundly from the claims made 
by earlier generations of suffragists and feminists.  While many progressive Victorian and post-
Victorian Britons had earlier criticized aspects of family life they deemed detrimental to women’s 
interests, only one person in early 20th-century Britain, to my knowledge, explicitly hoped to de-
naturalize the married couple (not so much the family itself) as the unit of the social: the feminist, 
sexologist, and communist Stella Browne.110  As Mitchell herself points out later in her article, “[t]he 
notion that ‘family’ and ‘society’ are virtually co-extensive terms, or that an advanced society not 
founded on the nuclear family is now inconceivable, is widespread.”111  Simply by directly calling 
this assumption into question, Mitchell challenges a fundamental organizing worldview of British 
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society throughout the lifetimes of her readers.  She opens up possibilities for entirely different forms 
of social organization, in ways that, as we will see, go to the very conceptual core of the “political” 
itself. 
I . Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Emotional-Intellectual Work 
“The situation of women is different from that of any other social group … Women are essential 
and irreplaceable; they cannot therefore be exploited in the same way as other social groups can.  
They are fundamental to the human condition, yet in their economic, social and political roles, they 
are marginal.  It is precisely this combination – fundamental and marginal at one and the same time 
– that has been fatal to them.”112  These opening sentences of “Women: the Longest Revolution” 
make clear to readers the profoundly unique nature of women’s subjection – the political, social, and 
economic disadvantages they face not despite but because of their centrality in the human imaginary.  
“Within the world of men,” Mitchell writes, “their position is comparable to that of an oppressed 
minority; but they also exist outside the world of men.  The one state justifies the other and 
precludes protest.”113  In other words, it is precisely because the separate position of women, as 
women, seems to be natural, biologically inevitable, advantageous to themselves and others, that it is 
so difficult to recognize as unjust.  It is worth noting here that one of the letters written to Betty 
Friedan referenced just this sense of female isolation: Anne Parsons, the daughter of sociologist 
Talcott Parsons, claimed that being an “‘unmarried career woman’” was “‘like being a Negro or Jew, 
with the difference that the prejudices are manifest in such subtle ways that it is very hard to pin 
                                                
112 Mitchell, “Women: the Longest Revolution,” 11. 
113 Mitchell, “Women: the Longest Revolution,” 11. 
 33 
them down, and that the feminine mystique is so strong and attractive an ideology that it is very 
hard to find a countervailing point of view from which to fight for oneself.’”114 
 As Mitchell herself acknowledges, “[t]here is no widespread demand for changes in [key 
components of their status] on the part of women themselves – the governing ideology has 
effectively prevented critical consciousness.”115  Here Mitchell employs the concept of false 
consciousness, as deployed by Marx and subsequent Left thinkers, to explain women’s blindness to 
their own interests.116  It is ideology – not nature or conflicting social patterns – that institutionalizes 
women’s disadvantage.  Ideology provides a useful tool for Mitchell to grasp the forces securing 
women’s adherence to an inequitable status quo.  She, like Friedan, understands that ideology 
succeeds by presenting itself as immutable truth.  “Like woman herself, the family appears as a 
natural object, but it is actually a cultural creation … The ‘true’ woman and the ‘true’ family are 
images of peace and plenty; in actuality they may both be sites of violence and despair … what Marx 
wrote about the bourgeois myths of the Golden Ancient World describes precisely women’s realm: 
‘in one way the child-like world of the ancients appears to be superior, and this is so, insofar as we 
seek for closed shape, form and established limitation.’”117  Here Mitchell, following Friedan, 
challenges the permanence of current concepts of “femininity” and “the family”, but adds a more 
explicit criticism of the very concepts themselves.  As Rachel Bowlby notes, The Feminine Mystique 
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“fails to ask whether there is a difference [emphasis added]”118 between men and women; it also fails 
to ask, in so many words, why “the family” is taken for granted as the basic social unit.  Mitchell’s 
ideology critique and social constructionism take a more radical form than Friedan’s, because the 
former attends more to the concept of ideology itself. 
As philosopher Charles Mills notes in his 2007 essay “White Ignorance,” it is through “the 
category ‘ideology’” that “[i]n the orthodox left tradition, [the] set of issues [relating to the adequacy 
of conceptions of the world] is handled.”119  Ideology is the conceptual rubric Mitchell uses to 
explain the internal contradictions and inconsistencies of gender as a social structure.  For Mitchell, 
“the family” is not a given in relation to which women’s aspirations must be negotiated, but a 
specifically bourgeois formation.  “[W]omen’s role in reproduction has become, in capitalist society 
at least, the spiritual ‘complement’ of men’s role in production.  Bearing children, bringing them up, 
and maintaining the home – these form the core of woman’s natural vocation, in this ideology.  This 
belief has attained great force because of the seeming universality of the family as a human institution 
[emphasis added].”120  The family seems to be universal, but is not necessarily so.  In a footnote, 
Mitchell restates the contention of Philippe Ariès in his landmark 1960 Centuries of Childhood that 
“though the family may in some form always have existed it was often submerged under more 
forceful structures … according to Ariès it has only acquired its present significance with the advent 
of industrialization.”121 
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Mitchell’s offhand observation that “[b]ourgeois society is obsessed by the physical, moral and 
sexual problems of childhood and adolescence”122 points to another paradoxical facet of the problem 
of women’s status.  As Lee Edelman notes in his 2004 book No Future: Queer Theory and the Death 
Drive, “the fantasy subtending the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the 
political itself must be thought.”123  It also, historically, has shaped the logic within which the 
problem of women’s status itself must be thought.  Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, 
conservative and radical women’s advocates and modernizing states justified reforms in women’s 
legal, educational, and political position with reference to the strengthening of the hegemonic Child, 
Home, Family, and Nation.124  This ambiguous legacy forms the backdrop against which Mitchell, 
Friedan, and their contemporaries attempt to formulate new social roles for women. 
Marxism, Mitchell notes, has failed to adequately grapple with the Woman Question.  “[T]he 
classical [socialist and communist] literature on the problem of woman’s condition is predominantly 
economist in emphasis,”125 and so many of the social and psychological props of male supremacy and 
female subordination are left unexamined.  “The complete failure to give any operative content to 
the slogan of ‘abolition’ of the family” has left a “void … occupied by [purportedly] traditional 
beliefs.”126  What is striking here is Mitchell’s assumption that it is the obligation of people on the 
Left to put forward alternatives to dominant familial ideology, and that only the absence of such 
alternatives leads to a conservative cultural consensus.  It is also remarkable that she assumes that 
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international socialism and communism had always or even often made the “‘abolition’ of the 
family” a central element in its program.  Throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries, it was on 
behalf of the family and essentialist visions of womanhood that socialists and even communists in 
modernizing states made their claims for wealth redistribution.  Racist and organicist gender 
ideologies had blinded many socialists of different nations to the possibilities of alternative family 
formations.127 
Significantly, it is in this section that Mitchell makes her only explicit reference to race and 
racism.  If from “[t]he biological function of maternity … follows … the stability and omnipresence 
of the family … women’s social subordination – however emphasized as an honourable, but different 
role (cf. the equal but ‘separate’ ideologies of Southern racists) – can be seen to follow inevitably as 
an insurmountable bio-historical fact.  The lynch-pin in this line of argument is the idea of the family 
[emphasis in the original].”128  As Maxine Baca Zinn notes in her essay “The Family as a Race 
Institution,” “[t]he dominant definition of ‘the family’ is an ideological code that expresses 
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differences from and superiority over ‘other’ family forms … [s]ymbolic meanings of family are 
shaped in opposition to the family forms of racial ‘others’.”129  The very hegemony of one type of 
family in the British imagination, Mitchell implies, emerges from a complex of social hierarchies, 
including racial hierarchy.  “The beliefs [sic] that the family provides an impregnable enclave of 
intimacy and security in an atomized and chaotic cosmos,” Mitchell writes, “assumes [sic] the 
absurd.”130  As we will see later, Mitchell contends that this belief inhibits the development of radical 
anti-capitalist critique.  Her criticism of “equal but ‘separate’ ideologies” is part of a long historical 
tradition of using anti-racist and other radical movements as entering wedges for raising feminist 
claims.131 
The central organizing principle of Mitchell’s essay is her “[differentiation]” of “woman’s 
condition” into “separate structures, which together form a complex – not a simple – unity.”132  This 
“complex unity” – of “Production, Reproduction, Sex and Socialization of children”133 – is always, in 
an Althusserian sense, “‘overdetermined.’”134  Mitchell’s footnote on Althusser’s use of the Freudian 
term “‘overdetermination’” emphasizes the complex interplay of temporality and dialectics in 
Althusser’s thought; different aspects of the social structure have different “time-scales,” whose 
“synthesis … means that sometimes contradictions cancel each other out and sometimes they 
reinforce one another.”135  Mirra Komarovsky’s observation in her 1953 book Women in the Modern 
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World: Their Education and Their Dilemmas – “‘technological and social changes over the past 
century and a half have disturbed an old equilibrium without as yet replacing it with another.  As a 
result, our society is a veritable crazy quilt of contradictory beliefs and practices’”136 – provides a 
similar, unacknowledged prefiguration of Mitchell’s dive into the paradox of change. 
II. Hegemonic Gender Ideology, Progress,  and Temporality 
Mitchell’s emphasis on the difficulty of distinguishing between progress and reaction parallels 
Friedan’s.  But whereas Friedan, in Bowlby’s words, “[sets] up feminism as freedom gained and 
lost,”137 Mitchell understands history in a more circular than linear fashion.  Recall her quotation 
from Marx: ‘[T]he ancients provide a narrow satisfaction, whereas the modern world leaves us 
unsatisfied or where it appears to be satisfied with itself, is vulgar and mean.”138  The implication 
here is that neither an idealized past nor an open future can be looked to for contemporary panaceas. 
This implication becomes more specific when Mitchell grapples with concrete ways of measuring 
and actualizing progress.  For Mitchell, earlier socialist discussions of women’s condition suffered 
from an ahistorical, inadequately specific futurism.  August Bebel’s canonical Woman in the Past, 
Present and Future “was a vague reverie, quite disconnected from his description of the past”139; 
Lenin “inherited a tradition of thought which … [equated] socialism with feminine liberation 
without showing concretely how it would transform woman’s condition”140; even de Beauvoir’s 
“prospect for women’s liberation at the end [of The Second Sex] is quite divorced from any historical 
development.”141  Altogether, “the classical literature on the problem of woman’s condition … fails 
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noticeably to project a convincing image of the future, beyond asserting that socialism will involve 
the liberation of women as one of its constituent ‘moments.’”142  Here, Mitchell’s emphasis is on the 
limitations of an open-ended assumption of progress – and, indeed, she problematizes the concept of 
progress itself, prefiguring Edelman’s much later insight that “the hope of forging … some more 
perfect social order … only reproduce[s] the constraining mandate of futurism.”143 
For Edelman, “politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to 
produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a 
structure, to authenticate social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of 
its inner Child.”144  As Sara Pursley argues, “reproductive futurism [the term coined by Edelman] is 
constituted by an interplay between cyclical-biological time and linear-historical time that is both 
modern and nationalist.  For female citizens, as agents of reproduction, this interplay heralds new 
opportunities but also the consolidation of more formidable pressures. Having been finally freed 
from the past, the nation‘s women were henceforth to be trapped in its future [emphasis added].”145   
Mitchell grapples with the problem of what modernity can mean for women long before these 
critical insights.  There is for her no automatic road to women’s liberation, no one development 
whose promise is free of potential setbacks, co-optations, or contradictions.  We have seen how 
cogently Betty Friedan criticized the labor-elaborating (techno)logics of household appliances.  
Industrialization, as Mitchell points out in a footnote, has not reduced the time women must spend 
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on housework: “it has been calculated in Sweden, that 2,340 million hours a year are spent by 
women in housework compared with 1,290 million hours in industry.  The Chase Manhattan Bank 
estimated a woman’s overall working hours as averaging 99.6 per week.”146  Women, Mitchell 
asserts, are exploited in the labor market as well as at home: “when the woman is gainfully employed 
… her job tends to be inferior to that of the man’s, to which the family then adapts”147; “[w]omen 
are poorly unionized (25 per cent) and receive less money than men for the work they do perform: 
in 1961 the average industrial wage for women was less than half that for men, which … represents a 
massive increment of exploitation for the employer.”148  (Unsurprisingly, Mitchell does not break 
these statistics down by class.)  Mitchell uses the Marxist concept of “coercion,” quoting Marx 
himself for a definition – “[treating] the slave or serf as the ‘inorganic and natural condition of its 
own reproduction’”149 – to explain the fact of women’s continued subordination: “coercion has been 
ameliorated to an ideology shared by both sexes [emphasis added].”150  The structural relationship of 
coercion and ideology is itself dialectical – women are “anatomically smaller and weaker,”151 but 
historically have been given enormous amounts of backbreaking labor to do.152   
In an earlier (1964) article for New Left Review on “Women’s Education,” Mitchell notes the 
ominous potential of the increased free time promised by automation: “Automation will bring more 
leisure, women must be trained to provide this.  Simone de Beauvoir hoped that automation would 
eliminate man’s physical superiority over woman … but if automation is seen … as the harbinger of 
a consumer civilization where leisure becomes a prolonged private domesticity, this instrument of 
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potential liberation could in itself become the most serious contemporary threat to women’s 
emancipation.”153  In “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell extends this insight into a 
prediction of women’s insecure status in a postmodern workplace: “[i]ndustrial labor and automated 
technology both promise the preconditions for woman’s liberation … but no more than the 
preconditions … De [sic] Beauvoir hoped that automation would make a decisive, qualitative 
difference … [b]ut any reliance on this … accords an independent role to technique which history 
does not justify.  Under capitalism, automation could lead to an … [expulsion of] women – the 
latest and least integrated recruits to the labour force and ideologically the most expendable for a 
bourgeois society … from production after only a brief interlude in it.”154 
Why are women “ideologically the most expendable” waged workers “for a bourgeois society?” 
Surprise, surprise – it is Edelman’s Child! “Women’s absence from the critical sector of production 
historically … has been caused not just by their physical weakness … but also by their role in 
reproduction.”155  Historically, opposition to married women’s work outside the home has been 
greatly influenced by the fear of its detrimental impact on children.  Friedan assures her readers that 
“[i]n countries like Israel and Russia, where women are expected to be more than just housewives … 
home and children and love are evidently not neglected.”156  She does not challenge the assumption 
that it is mothers who must care for children.  Mitchell has a different orientation.157  
“[R]eproduction, sexuality, and the socialization of children … are historically, not intrinsically, 
related to each other in the present modern family.”158  The “suitability” of women for socializing 
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children does not automatically equate to the “inevitability” of their serving as socializing agents.159  
Mitchell accepts that “we know far more than ever before how delicate and precarious a process the 
passage from birth to childhood is for everyone.  The fate of the adult personality can be largely 
decided in the initial months of life.”160  These findings represent “undoubted advances in the 
scientific understanding of childhood,”161 but “the need for permanent, intelligent care of children in 
the initial three or four years of their lives can be (and has been) exploited ideologically to perpetuate 
the family as a total unit, when its other functions have been visibly declining.”162  The “emphasis of 
familial ideology” is itself subject to historical change; it has “shifted away from a cult of the 
biological ordeal of maternity … to a celebration of mother-care as a social act.”163  Historical 
changes – the shrinking both of the family and of the time women spend in caring for children – 
mean that “the qualitative importance of socialization during the early years of the child’s life has 
acquired a much greater significance than in the past – while the quantitative amount of a mother’s 
life spent either in gestation or child-rearing has greatly diminished.”164  Like Friedan, Mitchell here 
implies, but does not state, that supposedly incontestable scientific knowledge has a social-historical 
as well as an independent factual basis.  The very factors of modern life that have minimized certain 
aspects of the maternal role – and that, therefore, could work towards women’s liberation from the 
home – have maximized other aspects of that role. 
Furthermore, Mitchell recognizes even more explicitly than Friedan the potential of 
“progressive” developments to recreate existing forms of inequality.  Polygamy – in ancient China, 
for example – was certainly “a total derogation of woman’s autonomy, and [constituted] an extreme 
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form of oppression,” but “[i]n the West … the advent of monogamy was in no sense an absolute 
improvement.  It certainly did not create a one-to-one equality – far from it.”165  In the 16th century 
in England, “[c]apitalism and the attendant demands of the newly emergent bourgeoisie accorded 
woman a new status as wife and mother … The formal, juridical equality of capitalist society and 
capitalist rationality now applied as much to the marital as to the labour contract.  In both cases, 
nominal parity masks real exploitation and inequality.  But in both cases the formal equality is itself 
a certain progress, which can help to make possible a further advance.”166  The birth-control pill 
could mean that “child-bearing … need no longer be the sole or ultimate vocation of woman,”167 but 
“oral contraception … has so far been developed in a form which exactly repeats the sexual 
inequality of Western society.”168  We have already seen Mitchell’s skepticism about the potential of 
industrialization and automation to liberate women: as she phrases it elsewhere in the article, 
“automation promises the technical possibility of abolishing completely the physical differential 
between man and woman … but under capitalist relations of production, the social possibility of this 
abolition is permanently threatened, and can easily be turned into its opposite, the actual diminution 
of woman’s role in the labour force.”169  Mitchell asserts that the percentage of women in England’s 
labor force has barely increased since 1911, although, again, she does not provide a class breakdown 
of this statistic.170  Moreover, the proportion of female to male university students has not changed 
in England since the 1920s (here again, a class breakdown of the statistic is lacking)171 – and, as 
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Mitchell notes in “Women’s Education,” the equivalent proportion of women in the United States 
has actually decreased.172 
In both “Women’s Education” and “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell, a British 
socialist, drops subtle hints that the United States is actually less, not more, progressive than Europe 
in the matter of women’s status, not despite its wealth and international hegemony, but because of 
it.  In “Women’s Education,” she reminds her readers that the United States is “the most developed 
capitalist country of all”173 immediately before letting her readers know about the decrease in the 
proportion of women to men students there.  Furthermore, “within this decrease there is evidence 
that greater and greater numbers of women are choosing courses that will be useful for marriage and 
maternity, not for a career.  With structural unemployment running at 6 million a year, the 
American economy is likely to have less work to offer women.  In Europe this is not yet the case.”174  
(As in “Women: the Longest Revolution,” so in “Women’s Education,” Mitchell does not provide 
class breakdowns of these statistics.)  In “Women: the Longest Revolution,” Mitchell notes that the 
US birthrate in the decade preceding her article has outstripped that of “under-developed” countries 
such as India.175  “[T]his reflects … the lesser economic burden of a large family in conditions of 
economic boom in the richest country in the world.  But it also reflects the magnification of familial 
ideology as a social force.”176  Certainly gender conservatism was widespread across the postwar 
world; it was not specific to the United States.  But Mitchell was correct about the relationship 
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between consumer capitalism, a “bigger and better” ethos, and conservative domestic ideology.177  
This brings us to Mitchell’s understanding of the contradictions and inconsistencies in dominant 
ideologies of gender and social progress.  
III. Hegemonic Gender Ideology’s Althusserian Dialectics 
Mitchell’s understanding of contradiction as a driving force of gender conservatism parallels 
Friedan’s, in that they both grasp the complex and paradoxical relationships between and among 
economic growth, rationalization, automation, liberal democracy, and social insistence on women’s 
domestic role.  For Mitchell, women’s economic situation is, and has been historically, full of 
contradictions.  We have seen her claim that industrialization and automation do not automatically 
equate to women’s liberation, and in fact can even result in their further exclusion from wage labor 
(assuming, as she does for the purposes of “Women’s Education” and “Women: the Longest 
Revolution,” that women are a unitary entity not divided by class – or race).  We have also seen her 
claim that the very economic changes that reduce the importance of certain aspects of women’s 
maternal role also elaborate and extend other aspects of it.  The underlying paradox here (which 
Friedan, as we have seen, also addresses) is that economic and political modernity and increased 
prosperity, which bring concrete material and psychological benefits to women, also contract their 
aspirations and impose on them new restrictions. 
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It is helpful here to quote sociologist Alice Rossi, a co-founder, with Friedan, of the National 
Organization for Women.  In a 1965 magazine article, “Women in Science: Why So Few?” Rossi 
quotes Harriet Martineau’s 1834 claim that “‘the prosperity of America is a circumstance 
unfavorable to its women,’ meaning women are not ‘put to the proof as to what they are capable of 
thinking and doing.’”178  Rossi also notes that “[s]ome child specialists may say that the mother is 
more necessary at home than ever, not only to love and care for the child but to stimulate the growing 
mind of the child [emphasis added].”179  Recall Mitchell’s own recognition that “we know far more 
than ever before how delicate and precarious a process the passage from birth to childhood is for 
everyone [emphasis added].”  Not even Rossi or Mitchell can fully recognize the cultural bias 
embedded in the idea that science, as such, has the right to claim from women “better” or “more” 
care than in the past.  Yet Mitchell recognizes that the very exaltation of women’s role as mothers is 
the Janus face of their low social status: “[E]ven if the woman has emotional control over her child, 
legally and economically both she and it are subject to the father.  The social cult of maternity is 
matched by the real socio-economic powerlessness of the mother.  The psychological and practical 
benefits men receive from this are obvious.”180  Furthermore, “[u]ltimate responsibility for [problems 
of childhood and adolescence] is placed on the mother.”181  The modernizing ideology of postwar 
motherhood was, like its earlier moral and republican version, “both empowering and humiliating,” 
as Gail Collins writes in When Everything Changed: The Amazing History of American Women from 
1960 to the Present.182 
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Mitchell recognizes the contradictions in dominant ideologies of sexuality and their alteration as 
they relate to women’s status as well.  “Historically … there has been a dialectical movement, in 
which sexual expression was ‘sacrificed’ in an epoch of more-or-less puritan repression, which 
nevertheless produced a greater parity of sexual roles, which in turn creates the precondition for a 
genuine sexual liberation.”183  Nonetheless, although “the current wave of sexual liberalization … 
could become conducive to the general freedom of women[,] [e]qually it could presage new forms of 
oppression.  The puritan-bourgeois creation of woman as ‘counterpart’ has produced the 
precondition for emancipation.  But it gave statutary [sic] legal equaility [sic] to the sexes at the cost 
of greatly intensified repression.”184  The promise of change, here as elsewhere, is always already a 
threat as well.  “[T]he dominant sexual ideology,” Mitchell notes, “is proving less and less successful 
… [sexuality] … is evidently the weak link in the chain – the particular structure that is the site of 
the most contradictions.”185  These contradictions have “progressive potential,”186 but they are also 
products of a capitalist society, and are symptoms of Herbert Marcuse’s “‘repressive de-
sublimation,’” which Mitchell defines as “the freeing of sexuality for its own frustration in the service 
of a totally co-ordinated and drugged social machine.”187  For Mitchell, the so-called sexual 
revolution, “while it presently may contain the greatest potential for liberation – can equally well be 
organized against any increase in its human possibilities.  New forms of reification are emerging 
which may void sexual freedom of any meaning.”188 
More broadly, “the liberation of women can only be achieved if all four structures [production, 
reproduction, sex, and socialization of children] in which they are integrated are transformed.  A 
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modification of any one of them can be offset by a reinforcement of another, so that mere 
permutation of the form of exploitation is achieved.”189  Women’s suffrage, “though a simple 
completion of the formal legal equality of bourgeois society … left the socio-economic situation of 
women virtually unchanged.  The wider legacy of the suffrage was nil: the suffragettes proved quite 
unable to go beyond their initial demands, and many of their leading figures later became extreme 
reactionaries.”190  The Soviet Union in the 1920s passed astonishingly radical legislation “aimed at 
liberating women above all in the field of sexuality,” but the effects of this were seen to be so 
destabilizing that “Stalinism soon produced a restoration of iron traditional norms.”191  In 
contemporary China, “all the emphasis is being placed on liberating women in production.  This has 
produced an impressive social promotion of women.  But it has been accompanied by a tremendous 
repression of sexuality and a rigorous puritanism [emphasis in the original].”192  The implication 
here, as with Friedan, is that the idea of liberation can easily be turned into its opposite, and that, in 
fact, that the concept of “liberation” can be only one side of a coin of social control. 
For Mitchell, a really desirable change in women’s condition requires “a transformation of all the 
structures into which they are integrated, and an [Althusserian] ‘unité de rupture.’”193  Althusser uses 
the term “unité de rupture” in For Marx, in trying to explain how revolution happens.194  
Elaborating on the Leninist metaphor of the “weak link in the chain,”195 Althusser explains that 
“anyone who wants to attack [a situation] … need only discover [its] one weakness to make all its 
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power precarious.”196  Mitchell, as we have seen, uses the phrase “the weak link in the chain” to 
describe “the structure that is the site of the most contradictions” – sexuality.197  But we have seen 
that neither changes in the sexual structure nor in any of her other three structures automatically 
“liberate” women.  If radical social changes in the industrialized West, and even in the Eastern Bloc, 
have not resulted in real freedom for women, the implication is that the mutually reinforcing aspects 
of their disadvantageous position require an explosive force to obliterate the tendencies of 
overdetermination. 
I argue that the “lynch-pin” of her insight into women’s condition is indeed her challenge to 
“the idea of the family.”  Mitchell is well aware of the ways in which women’s labor-force 
participation has been played off against their family responsibilities, to the detriment of their 
position in both areas.  Historically, the vulnerabilities of women in the labor market – their lack of 
choices, inability to advance up the job ladder, unsanitary conditions, sexual exploitation, and low 
pay – have been corollaries of their responsibility for social reproduction in the home.  Mitchell 
seems to grasp that as long as a hegemonic Family is held up as the foundation of British society and 
the very essence of its continuation, conservative gender ideology will prevail.  Mitchell goes beyond 
the majority of earlier suffragists and feminists in her refusal to accept that women are wives and 
mothers first and foremost.  Although “[m]odern industrial development … tends toward the 
separating out of the originally unified function of the family … procreation, socialization, sexuality, 
economic subsistence, etc.,” such “‘structural differentiation’ … has been checked and disguised by 
the maintenance of a powerful family ideology.”198  The circle must be squared; modernity must be 
made to live up to its potential.  The very “attempt to focus women’s existence exclusively on 
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bringing up children, is manifestly harmful to children … Exclusive maternity is often in this sense 
‘counter-productive.’”199  But it is just as wrong to simply call for “the ‘abolition of the bourgeois 
family.’  This slogan … is maximalist in the bad sense, posing a demand which is merely a negation 
without any coherent construction subsequent to it.”200  A totalizing, negative aim is worse than no 
aim at all, since it leaves unchallenged the concept that is being negated.  It is the concept of the 
family itself, in Mitchell’s view, which must be rethought. 
“[A]ll human experience shows that intersexual and intergenerational relationships are infinitely 
various … while the institutionalized expression of them in our capitalist society is utterly simple 
and rigid.”201  This points to another paradox of the postwar era: at the very point when the 
multiplication of human activity along various lines of endeavor should have ensured a less socially 
constrained life for everyone, rigid conceptions of the family and women’s role became even more 
hegemonic.202  This contradiction is neatly captured by Jessica Weiss: “[t]he Cold War liberalism 
that nourished Friedan’s ideals of individual equality for women harbored a contradictory ideal that 
pulled just as strongly in the opposite direction.  In this view, women’s continued selflessness in the 
face of increased options created individualism in the next generation.”203  Mitchell wrestles with this 
central problem of reproduction, rights, and power: “No human being can create another human 
being.  A person’s biological origin is an abstraction.  The child as an autonomous person inevitably 
threatens the activity which claims to create it continually merely as a possession of the parent … 
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202 Eli Zaretsky asserts that “[t]he dominant ideology of the postwar family … reflected the shift from a class- and 
community-based industrial society to a family-centered postindustrial society oriented to mass consumption.  With 
hitherto undreamed-of possibilities for private consumption, personal life … now assumed a mass form for the first 
time.”  See Zaretsky, “Charisma or Rationalization?,” 338. 
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[a]nything the child does is therefore a threat to the mother herself who has renounced her 
autonomy through this misconception of her reproductive role.”204   
The paradoxes of women’s situation thus go to the very heart of what it means to be human - the 
very heart of humanity’s potential for biological, psychological, and social growth and change.  For 
Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, “what peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman” is “that 
she – a free and autonomous being like all human creatures – nevertheless finds herself living in a 
world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other.  They propose to stabilize her as 
object and to doom her to immanence [emphasis added]” – in other words, men block women from 
“a continual reaching out toward other liberties … [an] expansion into an indefinitely open 
future.”205  Here de Beauvoir hitches her wagon to the star of futurism – but, as we shall see, her and 
Mitchell’s futurism is different from the reproductive futurism Edelman criticizes.  The end of 
“Women: the Longest Revolution” shares de Beauvoir’s emphasis on temporality and progress; it is a 
paragraph-long disquisition – with quotes from Marx – on the desirability of an open-ended vision 
of the future. 
“Circumstantial accounts of the future,” Mitchell writes, “are idealist and worse, static.  
Socialism will be a process of change, of becoming.”206  Mitchell quotes Marx’s definition of 
progress: “‘the absolute elaboration of (man’s) creative dispositions, without any preconditions other 
than antecedent historical evolution which makes the totality of this evolution – i.e. the evolution of 
all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously established yardstick – an end in itself … a 
situation where man does not reproduce himself in any determined form, but produces his totality[.]  
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Where he does not seek to remain something formed by the past, but is the absolute movement of 
becoming[.]’”207  For Mitchell – as well as for Marx and de Beauvoir – the ideal of progress is an 
anti-reproductive futurism, a repudiation of what de Beauvoir calls “the ‘en-soi’ – the brutish life of 
subjection to given conditions.”208  This kind of progress contrasts with that envisioned by the 
experts criticized by Friedan, who commend the “modern bride” for consciously “[choosing] among 
all possible careers the career of wife-mother-homemaker.”  The emphasis of the latter kind of 
progress is on rationalized planning for limited options; the emphasis of the former kind of progress 
is on movement toward an unspecified, but always implicitly revolutionary, end, one not confined by 
contemporary prejudices.  The irony here is that Mitchell, who has criticized earlier socialist thinkers 
for their failure to paint a clear picture of a free society, is no more able to give a definite account of 
the future than they were.  We see here the ultimate reliance of radical thought on shifting goalposts 
and reference points; the alternative to the “‘closed form and established limitation’” of Marx’s past 
is not a wholly closed and established program, but an indefinitely expandable period of trial and 
error.  Futurism functions dialectically in radical thought, split between the conflicting imperatives 
of creative freedom and concrete planning.   
Thus Mitchell, as influenced by de Beauvoir and Marx, carefully rethinks the relationships 
between and among reproduction, freedom, improvement, progress, and temporality.  Many 
suffragists and feminists in Victorian and Edwardian Britain had shared an Edelmanian focus on the 
Child and had described women in essentialist, familial terms; as noted by Sandra Stanley Holton in 
her 1986 book Feminism and Democracy: Women’s Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900-
1918, they had claimed “that because women mothered they were more caring and nurturant … [i]t 
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was … claimed that women, because they nurtured and men did not, could offer skills and 
understanding of particular relevance to … the education of children, public health, and the 
management and care of the poor.”209  One early 20th-century suffragist claimed the vote on the basis 
of “‘our very womanhood, with its inborn instinct to childward care’”210; another, agreeing with an 
anti-suffragist that “‘no sane person can deny that men and women are different, for Nature has 
made them so.  It is only in combination as a group – father, mother, child – that they reach 
completion; it is only thus in the effort of rearing children for the race that they best develop,’” 
added, “my belief in the truth of this contention is my chief reason for believing in the necessity for 
removing the sex-disability.”211  Mitchell, writing some six decades later, recognizes that such 
organicist and biologist views of the family and women’s role can handicap a critical socialist 
approach.  For Mitchell – and Friedan – it is not enough to claim that women’s difference, their 
unique moral qualities, their familial responsibilities, necessitate an improvement in their political 
and social position.  They take a more radical approach – an approach that assumes that natural is a 
smokescreen for ideological.  Women are not mothers who can nurture the nation, but individuals 
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 Feminism as a social current has never been a unitary entity.  It is precisely because the 
political category of “women” and the arguments made on behalf of improving their social position 
have been so internally inconsistent and incomplete – and yet so profoundly relevant for the lives of 
all those identified as “women” and all those identified as belonging to other gender categories – that 
the historical evolution of these arguments is so absorbing a topic of study.  For the two authors 
under discussion in this essay and for others before and after them, constituting “women” as a 
political group whose status should be changed has meant grappling with complex and shifting 
realities of power, status, language, and temporality.  As I have shown, for Betty Friedan and Juliet 
Mitchell to challenge established views on the proper relationship of “women” to 1960s modernity 
in its manifold forms (automation, globalization, the so-called sexual revolution), they had to 
recognize that “scientific,” psychoanalytic, and consumerist discourses were not the final word on the 
nature and proper functions of women.  They had to understand how the discursive field of 
possibilities for social change was constructed and delimited and how it could be expanded.  Last, 
but not least, they had to recognize the complexity of liberal reformism, of proposals for social 
change that proposed to partially restructure these relations.  
It is evident that the work of both Friedan and Mitchell is radical on all three of these counts.  
Friedan, as we have seen, uses the words of Freudian psychologists and Freudian-influenced social 
scientists against them; she performs a masterful close reading of Margaret Mead in particular, 
alerting her readers to the inherently unstable, contradictory, and challenging nature of liberal 
claims.  Mitchell goes even further in her recognition of gender and sexuality as ideological structures 
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mediated by society as a whole, profoundly shaped by the ever-present possibilities of compromise 
and retreat.   
If there is any foundation on which the critical epistemologies and disciplines of the post-1960s 
Left and postmodernism in general rest, it is the conviction that virtually every feature of the 
physical, social, and political world is mediated if not actually created by shifting fields of power-
knowledge – with the explosive corollary that there is no given beyond which human social 
formations cannot go, no unchangeable hierarchy of bodies, knowledge, and institutions.  What 
makes this most radical of all human insights possible is a critical concept of ideology.  This concept 
not only enables the leap from an organicist theological worldview such as that of medieval Europe, 
but the leap – hardly less revolutionary – from a Victorian Darwinist worldview in which hierarchies 
of gender, race, and physical “fitness” were construed as having a biological basis, beyond which they 
could only shift so far, if at all.212 
This theoretical shift, with its profound implications for all forms of human thought, is 
anticipated in the work of Friedan and Mitchell.  It is, of course, wholly erroneous to claim that 
either Friedan or Mitchell go to the extreme of claiming that there are no “pure” facts, no absolute 
realities.  But their work is hugely important for feminist ideology critique, critical theory, and social 
constructionism, which are crucial pillars of a coherent anti-racist, anti-sexist, and anti-homophobic 
philosophy.  Radical ideology critique is important precisely because of its vulnerability and fragility, 
its rootedness in the very structures of domination it tries to undo; the histories of 19th- and 20th-
century feminism – and of the abolitionism that was its progenitor – vividly illustrate this.  What is 
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significant about Friedan and Mitchell is not simply that they issue fundamental challenges to male 
dominance as an organizing principle of society – itself a profoundly difficult, and still unusual, 
endeavor in the 1960s – but that they recognize the contradictions and vulnerabilities in such 
challenges.  To understand that deep and corrosive injustices are foundational to a society, and to 
recognize that surface changes will not eliminate them, takes a unique act of imagination and 
courage.  But to recognize that there is no pure form of resistance to these injustices, to question 
totalizing narratives and utopian, conflict-free visions of a social order, is to attain a historically 
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